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EXPLAINING THE POLITICAL LOYALTIES OF BUSINESSMEN AND
LANDO~S IN CHILE'S TRANSITION FROM AUTHORITARIANISM, 1983-91

Chile is often portrayed as an exceptional case among recent transitions from
authoritarian rule for a ,number of reasons, not all of them necessarily laudable. It was· the
last of the "new authoritarian" regimes to democratize; the transition followed the timetable
and conditions s~t by the military more closely than elsewhere; the prognosis for economic
1

and political stability seems ,optimistic relative to the rest of the region. Central to these
examples of Chilean exceptionality is the fact that, unlike most other cases, Chile's business
and landowning elites supported the military government to the end.
What induced Chilean upper classes to remain lpyal to Pinochet in the face of his
unswerving adherence to neoliberal policies that devastated them in 1983-84? Mo'st studies
· argue that the Chilean bourgeoisie feared resurgent socialism more than Pinochet's steadfast.
imposition of structural economic change. This article will show that
although that was
.
. a
matter of concern, such views take the upper classes' rhetoric too much at face value. More
important was the fact that Chile's business and landowning groups forged a cohesive
alliance--the pragmatic neoliberal coalition--around a specific set of policy proposals in 1983,
and that Pinochet responded favorably to its demands.
This paper argues that the pragmatic coalition;s success had three important
· consequences for Chile's transition from authoritarianism between 1983 and 1988. _First, the
inclusion of all major capitalist groups inthe economic policy coalition, their exclusive
access to the policymaking process, and policy concessions on the part of the military

/

2
government cemented the relationship between capitalists and Pinochet for the plebiscite of
1988. As a result, no capitalist or landowning group.was available· for an alliance with the
main opposition group seeking an end to Pinochet's_dictatorship, Alianza Democratica (AD).
Second, the absence of a broad multi-dass movement for political democratization
significantly influenced the process of Chile~s shift from an authoritarian to a democratic
..

"

>

form of gove_rnment. 1 It allowed the military government to adhere to the timetable and
conditions for political liberalizat~on set forth in the 1980 Constitution. 2 Moreover, the
institutional conditions tha_t ensured a "protected" democracy--one in which the military
retained veto power over civilian authori,ties, and that built in a conservative bias to
economic policymaking--remained intact. 3
1

Political democratization takes place when an authoritarian regime gives way to a
system that allows conflicting elites to alternate in ppwer; Representatiye democracy
requires fully competitive elections with universal participation. Voters should be able to
choose by secret ballot among candidates that hold different views on public policy-..
Representative democracy also calls for guarantees such as freedom of political organization
and expression, as well as institutions that keep policymakers responsive to the citizenry.
Such institutions include, effective legislatures and political parties, as well as interest group
organizations. For this definition see the introduction to Paul W. Drake and Eduardo· Silva,
eds., Elections and Democratization in Latin America. 1980-85 (San Diego: Center for
Iberian and Latin American Studies; Centf?r for U.S.-Mexican Studies; Institute of .the
Americas, 1986). Also see, Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions
from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
2

Political liberalization takes place when dictators expand political participation by
easing up on repression and introducing some ci~il liberties.
contrast to political
democratization, -it does not involve increased competition -f~r the transfer of power to
contending groups. During a .process of political liberalization semi-competitive elections
may be held in order to authenticate an ·authoritarian regime domestically and internationally,
but the government party invariably dominates such processes. See, Drake and Silva, eds.,
Elections and Democratization; and. (?'Donnell and Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions.

In

3

Brian Loveman, II ,Misi6n Cumplida? Civil Military Relations and the Chilean Political
Transition," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 33, no. 3, 1991.

3

The pragmatic coalition's success, and AD's failure to build a broad multiclass
coalition for political change, had a third consequence. Between 1985 and 1988, ~nits
efforts to ally capitalist.fears of democr~tization, AD moderated its economic policy platform
even more than it had ·in 1984. As the plebiscite drew nearer it was increasingly manifest
that capitalists' rejection of AD had more to do with its aversion to mild social democratic •.
reformism than any real· fear of revolutionary socialism. This suggests that when AD failed
to draw capitalists into an explicit coalition for regiqie change it joined them in an implicit
conservative compact to assure deI,llocratization. In other words, AD committed itself to the
pragmatic neoliberal coalition's economic model in exchange for aGquiescence to political
change-on the part of capitalists and landowners. This gave rise to·a democratic founding
coalition in which conservative-forces hold the upper hand. Consequently, reformists will
find it difficult to formulate and pass policies designed to address the issue of soc~al equity in
Chile.
'

BUSINESSMEN AND-LANDOWNERS IN TRANSITIONS FROM
AUTHORITARIANISM IN LATIN AMERICA

A significant body"of writing suggests that political change--especially reforms such as
political liberalization and democratization--often begins with splits at the top. 4 Under what ·
circumstances do cleavages among the elites tum 'into conflict? The literature on
authoritarianism argues that· the inclusion -or exclusion of significant large::.scale business and

4

Theda Skocpol, States and ·social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France.
Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); O'Donnell and
Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions; Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw
Hill, 1938).
·

4
landowning groups in dominant economic policy coalitions colors their support for such
/

regimes.

5

Where they are included in the policy coalition, have access to the policy-making

process and can defend themselves against measures that threaten their fundamental interests-property and profits--upper class elites remain loyal to a regime.
Put another way, for businessmen and landowners, these factors measure an
authoritarian regime's reliability. 6 This means that when the opposite holds true a regime is
unreliable, and excluded capitalist and landowning groups may tum against it. Disgruntled
members of the upper class may prefer a more democratic form of government because such
regimes offer more points of access and influence in policy-making.7 They also encourage
more open and diverse sources of information which is often crucial to decision-making in
business.
(

Nevertheless, the regime loyalties of capitalists and landowners also depend on
economic performance. 8 Upper class groups shut out of policy-making may not oppose an

5

Douglas Chalmers and Craig Robinson, "Why Power Contenders Choose
Liberalization'," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 1, 1982; Guillermo O'Donnell,
"Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy," in David
Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1979).
6

Robert Kaufman, "Liberalization and Democratization in South America: Perspectives
from the 1970s," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead,
eds. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1986); Jeffery Frieden, "Winners and Losers in tlie Latin ·
American Debt Crisis: The Political Implications," in Barbara Stallings and Robert Kaufman,
eds., Debt and Democracy in Latin America (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).
7
8

Chalmers and Robinson, "Why Power Contenders Choose Liberalization.".

Frieden, "Winners and Losers in the Latin American Debt Crisis," and Chalmers and
Robinson, "Why Power Contenders Choose Liberalization."

\
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authoritarian regime during good economic times. But during prolonged, deep economic
downturns they may cast about for alternatives. However,-whether they do so or not may
hinge on the character of emerging political party systems. 9 • Capitalists are more likely to
support political liberalization and democratization when leftist, socialist, and populist
political parties are weak.
A considerable empirical literature supports such views. Research on Ecuador, Peru,
Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic showed that business elites supported a shift from _
authoritarianism to more democratic rule because they believed they would have greater
access to the economic policy-making process, under conditions in which the perceived threat
from below was low . 10 Similar evidence exists for the cases of Argentina, Brazil,· Mexico,
and Venezuela. 11 Capitalists turned to democracy due to varying combinations of the

9

Robert Kaufman, "Liberalization and Democratization in Latin'America"; Fneden,
"Winners and Losers in- the Latin American Debt Crisis;" and Edward. C. Epstein,
"Legitimacy, Institutionalization, and Opposition in -Exclusionary Bureaucratic-Authoritarian
Regimes: The Situation of the 1980s," Comparative Politics, vol. 17, no. 1, 1984.

°

1

Catherine M. Conaghan; James Malloy and Luis Abugattas, "Business and the Boys:
The Politics of Neoliberalism in the Central Andes," Latin American Research Review, vol.
25, no. 2, 1990; Catherine M. Conaghan and Rosario Espinal, "Unlikely Transitions to
Uncertain Regimes? Democracy without Compromise in the Dominican Republic and
Ecuador," Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 22, no. 3, 1990.
11

William C.-Smith, Authoritarianism and the Crisis of Argentine Political Economy
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989); Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Entrepreneurs
and the Transition-to Democracy in Brazil," in O'Donnell, et al., eds., Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives; Sylvia Maxfield, "National Business, DebtLed Growth, and Political Transition," in Stallings and Kaufman, eds_., Debt and Democracy;
Rene Millan, Los empresarios ante el estado y la sociedad (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno
Editores, 1988); F:rieden, "Winners and Losers," in Stallings and Kaufman, eds., Debt and
Democracy.
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following factors: their exclusion from economic policy-making, poor economic performance
under authoritarianism, and low salience of the threat from below.
This brings the discussion back to the is_sue of Chilean exceptionality. Most studies
argue that Chilean large-scale businessmen and landowners chafed- under the same
unfavorable conditions as their peers elsewhere in Latin.America--they were excluded from
economic
policy-making and suffered
deeply during severe
economic- crises. Given these.
.
.
.
,

assumptions they conclude that Chilean capitalists supported Pinochet because they feared
resurgent socialism in the wake of the 1983-84 economic debacle. In other words, the main
difference between Chile and the other cases lay in the degree of threat from below.
This article argues that the c~cial difference between Chile and the other Latin
American cases lay elsewhere. Chilean capitalists supported Pinochet because they were
included rather than excluded from economic policy-making, under conditions in which the
I

threat from below was far from overwhelmin~. Moreover, the Chilean bourgeoisie accepted
Pinochet's defeat in the October 1988 plebiscite because the opposition committed itself to
the retention of their economic model.
BUSINESSMEN, LANDOWNERS, PRAGMATIC NEOLIBERALISM AND MASS
MOBILIZATION: 1983-85.

The Chilean military government was at its weakest during the economic crisis of
1983-85, It faced an entrepreneurial revolt against extreme free.:market policies, and mass
mobilization demanding democratization. During this crucial period, the opposition's attempt
to wrestle control of the pace and nature of political change away from Pinochet failed .
because it was unable to form a cross-class coalition that included disgruntled capitalists.

7

Building such an alliance required turning a conflict between capitalists and the regime over
economic policy into support for rapid democratization. But Pinochet foiled the opposition
by regaining the bourgeoisie's undivided loyalty. To make the case, the following sections
will outline the military regime's economic an4 political project; the economic policy
differences between capitalists and the regime; how the opposition tried to capitalize on
them, and what Pinochet did to patch them up.
Backdrop to Crisis

After the overthrow of Allende and the demobilization of society, Chile's military
government set two- goals. It wanted to replace democratic with authoritarian politics and
statist with free-market economic policies. To that end,· Pinochet consolidated one man rule
and sponsored a cadre of neoliberal technocrats--the so-called Chicago Boys because many of
them studied neoclassical economics at the University of Chicago--to design and implement
extreme laissez-f~re economic policies. 12
Pinochet insulated the Chicago Boys from the pressure of societal groups that
protested economic restructuring, including businessmen and landowners. 13 It should be
recognized, however, that those policies enjoyed considerable support from a limited number
of conglomerates that expanded rapidly under the new economic policies. Those

12

Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies: Chile Under Pinochet
(New York: Norton and Company,·,1991); Juan Gabriel Valdes,· La escuela de Chicago:
Operaci6n Chile (Buenos Aires: Editorial Zeta, 1989); Sebastian Edwards and Alejandra
Cox-Edwards, Monetarism and Liberalization: The Chilean Experiment (Cambridge:
Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987) .
13

Guillermo Campero, Los gremios empresariales en el periodo 1970-1983:
comportamiento sociopolitico y orientaciones ideol6gicas (Santiago: instituto Latinoamericano ·
de Estudios Transnacionales, 1984).
·
.
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conglomerates concentrated their assets in economic sectors favored by economic
restructuring: nontraditional exports, consumer imports, and foreign loan intermediation. 14
Between 1977 and 1981 the Chilean .economy boomed, and by 1979 the peak associations of
large-scale businessmen and landowners .solidly supported Pinochet9s economic and political
model. _
The culmination of the military government's design for political change came in
1980, at the height of the economic boom, With the ratification a new constitution. The
charter, according to the government, was approved by 67% of the·voters. But the plebiscite
was noncompetitive, and it provided no safeguards for opposition groups. The constitution
extended Pinochet'·s authority to 1988, at which time there would be another noncompetitive plebiscite to decide whether he would continue to rule until at least 1997.: The- charter's permanent articles sought to impose

a"protected" democracy, one in which the military

would continue to exercise a tutelary role over civilian governments through a National
Security Council. 15 ,
The arrogant triumphalism of Chilean authoritarians ended abruptly with the collapse
of the domestic economy between 1982 and 1983. In one year GDP contracted by over
14 %. As a result of this economic failure, the military government was at its weakest_
between 1983 and 1985. The conglomerates that had provide:<f the core support for ,the

14

Fernando Dahse, El mapa de la extrema riqueza (Santiago: Editorial Aconcagua,
1979); Andres Sartfuentes, "Los grupos econ6micos: Control y polfticas," Colecci6n Estudios
Cieplan, no. 15, December, 1984.
15

Paul Drake and-Ivan Jaksic, introduction to their edited volume, The Struggle for
Democracy in Chile, 1982-1990 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991); Brian
Loveman, "z:rv~:isi6n Cumplida?".

regime's economic and social policies disintegrated; entrepreneurial groups turned against
extreme neo_liberal policies as they sought relief from ruin; and a mass mobilization
movement of middle and lower class groups spearheaded by resurgent opposition political
parties challenged Pinochet's rule.·

Business:qien, the Opposition and Pinochet: 1983
Up to 1983, Pinochet inflexibly supported radical neoliberal economic policies. 16
The government clung to.low real exchange rates (indeed, a fixed rate between 1979-82),
high interest rat~s, low across-the-board customs tariffs (10%) with little non-tariff
protection, deflationary monetary policies, and a general disinterest in government sponsored
debt relief or sectoral policies. 17 In addition to these characteristics, the policy-making
process pointedly excluded organized business' peak associations.
During the boom years, firms _and individuals could invest, consume and paper over
difficulties by borrowing extensively. But when the flood of foreign lending dried up in
1982, econom~c hard times set in with a vengeance. GDP contracted over 14% in one year.
The business peak associations responded to debt-induced bankruptci€?s, lack of credit due to
restrictive monetary policies, stiff import competition, and ·an overvalued currency that
stymied exports. By Jl1id-1983, Chile's large-scale business and landowning groups had

.

.r

formed an explicit ''pragmatic" .neoliberal economic policy coalition that sponsored an

16

Their radicalness can be measured in terms of their degree .of laissez-faireness and the
zeal with which they were applied compared to other cases, such as Argentina and Uruguay.
17

For a description of neoliberal policies during this period see, Alejandro Foxley, · Latin
American· Experiments in Neoconservative Economics (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1983); and Joseph Ramos, Neoconservative Economics in the Southern Cone of Latin
America. 1973-1983 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Universio/ Press, 1986) ..
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alternative economic recovery program; The coalit~on was still neoliberal in that it favored
market mechanisms over state regulation. But it was pragmatic in that it recognized that the
state should play a larger role in the economy than it had.
The pragmatic neoliberal coalition had its origins in explicit bargaining among Chile's
six major peak associations. These negotiations took place under the aegis of the
Confederation of Production and Commerce (CPC), the peak associations' umbrella
organization, which.publicized its economic recovery program, "Recuperaci6n econ6mica:
Amilisis y proposiones," in July, 1983. The document called for high real exchange rates to
stimulate exports and protect against imports, higher across-the-board tariffs with protection
against unfair competition, a reflationary monetary policy, low interest rates, debt relief, and
sectoral policies (such as export promotion, construction projects, agricultural development).
l

The CPC and its affiliates .also.demanded a more inclusive, instituti~nalized policy-making
process. Pinochet largely ignored these pleas for help from an increasingly desperate
business community. 18
As
the business community's critique of government economic policy gained intensity,
\
working and middle class groups were growing increasingly restive as well. Their discontent
erupted in May, 1983, when a national day of protest largely directed by the copper workers
union succeeded beyond the wildest dreams of its organizers. The massive demonstration\
against Pinochet shook the regime to its core.

18

Eduardo Silva, "The Political Economy of Chile's Regime Transition: From Radical to
Pragmatic Neoliberal Policies," in Drake and Jaksic, eds., The Struggle for Democracy in
Chile~

11
A coalition of centrist and center-left parties dominated by the Christian Democrats
quickly took control of the opposition movement--Alianza Democratica (AD)--and began
staging monthly protests. 19 AD's goal was to tum the 1980 Constitution's limited political
liberalization into full-fledged democratization. AD demanded free, competitive elections
with full citizen participation and civil guarantees by 1985. That meant stripping Pir.iochet of
his power, abrogating the perpetual state of emergency, rescinding restrictions ·on political
party activity, allowing ·exiles to return, and an end to the political exclusion of Marxist
parties.
Alianza Democratica realized that achieving a rapid and smooth transition to
democratic rule required negotiation with the military and conservatlves--but without
Pinochet. AD also knew that to accomplish that goal it had to broaden the class base of the _
opposition movement that it controlled. It needed the support of one or more capitalist
groups.
To thatend, AD tried to tum the conflict over economic policy between capitalists
and the military government into support for regime change. Throughout 1983, the Christian
Democratic Party (PDC) and Alianza Democratica sought to build an implicit alliance with"
capitalists and conservativ~ political parties, based on a moderate economic program largely
tailored to the rising pragmatic business coalition's demands. The alliance attempt was
implicit because · AD sought backing on the basis of complementary interests over economic
policy, rather than enter into direct negotiation with business associations.

19

Manuel Antonio Garret6n, The Chilean Political Process, (Boston: Unwin Hymaµ,
1989; and Reconstruir la poHtica: Trarisici6n y consolidaci6n democratica en Chile (Santiago:
Editorial Andante, 1987).

J
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Seeking to diminish the bourgeoisie's anxiety over political change, AD quickly
established its allegiance to capitalist development in early 1983. ~Within the context of a
mixed economy, AD pledged to respect private property, as well as .to continue prudent
macroeconomic and foreign debt management. It supported sectoral economic policies,
especially industrial policy and debt relief, rapid economic reactivation and ,a tougher
negotiating -position with the IMF to ex.tract the resources necessary to reflate the economy
without heavy inflation. 20 In other words, AD tried to assuage both the military and
entrepreneurs that an early transition to democracy, with substantial revisions to the 1980
Constitution, would not mean a return to Unidad Popular-style socialism.
These factors constitute the first of two types of evidence that suggest that-the threat
of radical economic and social change in a process of democratization was somewhat
overdrawn., After all, AD not only proposed a moderate economic platform, but its_
will~ngness to work with the military and conservative forces would have ~nited the vast
majority of political forces around a project of negotiated transition. to democracy. That
strategy could have effectively isoiated the Marxist-opposition movement--the Movimiento
Democratico Popular (MDP) ..
Despite the PDC's and AD's assurances, however, the opposition was unable to
obtain capitalist support for redemocratization, that is, an early transition to democracy under
less·restrictive institutional conditions. To the opposition's dismay, beginning in late .

20

Alejandro Foxley, 11 Algunas condiciones para una democratizaci6n estable: El caso de
Chile, 11 Colecci6n Estudios Cieplan, no. 9, December 1982; Oue Pasa, no. 612, December
30, 1982, no. 613, January 6, 1983, no. 647, September L 1983; CIEPLAN,
Reconstrucci6n econ6mica para la democracia (Santiago: Editorial Aconcagua, 1983).
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September 1983 the capitalist critique of government economic policy began to abate. This
was significant because the split at the top of the military government in 1983 offered AD the
only opportunity to win support f~om capitalists -for rapid democratization. When the clash
between capitalists and the military government diminished so did AD's prospects for ~ly
democratization.
The sequencing between the eruption

of mass mobilization (May, 1983) and the

abatement of the capitalist critique of government economic policy (September-Octo~er?
1983) reinforces the thesis that the threat from below was not sufficient to explain why
dissident business and landowning groups returned to the authoritarian fold. After all, it was
capital's critique of Pinochet's economic policy that fed AD's hopes of constructing a broad
cross-class alliance against the dictatorship. Moreover, the rift between the General and the
bourgeoisie had initially fueled and legitimized the opposition movement. Thus, if it was
dread of the threat from below--which included "socialist" AD--that largely motivated
capitalists to close ranks with the military government, they should have done so shortly after
the eruption of mass mobilization.
Significantly, the CPC did not soften its confrontation with the military government

.
until after the fifth national day of protest, almost half a year later. Not only that, but when
mass mobilization began, instead of retreating, capitalists escalated their dispute with the
regime. In July they presented their economic recovery plan to the government and lobbied·
hard for it both in private and in public. Ominously,' the business and landowner coalition,
out of frustration with the lack of response to their proposals by the government, issued

14
veiled threats that it mightjoin the opposition. 21 Equally significant, in September 1983-just before and after the fifth protest~-capitalist's pressed Pinochet to replace the ministers of
finance and economy with men who favored reflationary policies.
In short, altl10ugh Chilean capitalists worried over the potential political consequences
of mass mobilization; instead of downscaling their confrontation with the military

'
government over eco.nomic policy, they escalated _it. The business and landowning coalition
must have had some confidence that if the regime fell a complete reversal of the .neoliberal
· experiment would. not follow. Otherwise; the strategy that they did pursue--hedging .bets to
extract concessions from both government and opposition-.;would have been far too risky. In
other words, at the very least, capitalists felt that the threat from below was not severe
enough to preclude their use of political unrest to gain negotiating leverage against Pinochet
and the Chicago Boys.
What changed. at the end of September and the beginning of October, i983, that
induced capitalists to abate their critique -of government economic policy? In the face of both
massive monthly demonstrations and the mobilization of medium and small entrepreneurs,
the government needed to recapture· the solid support of Chilean large-scale capitalists. The
, defection of a significant capitalist group to either of those protesting groups would have
significantly increased the opposition's momentum. As a result, the military government

21

For example, when the CPC distributed its economic recovery plan to government
ministers, the Society for Industrial Development (SFF) cautioned. that although the: pnvate
sector did not wish to break with the government it might be forced into opposition; see Que
Pasa, no. 639, July 7, 1983. In the same spirit, Jorge Fontaine, president of the CPC,
declared that business only sought confrontation with governments when its survival was at
stake. The authorities should realize, continued Fontaine, that adherence to orthodox
deflation ·would lead to perdition; see, Hoy, no. 31L July 6, 1983.

15
began to negotiate economic policy reforms along the lines suggested in Recuperaci6n
econ6mica in return for less militant business critiques. 22 In other words, the threat of a
multi-class opposition alliance that included capitalists enabled the pragmatic neoliberal
coalition to translate its economic policy preferences into policy.
Government concessions to the pragmatic coalition began in August 1983, and were·
of two types. On the one hand, cabinet changes held out the promise of real negotiations in
keeping with CPC proposals. On the other hand, the authorities also began to implement
economic policy changes suggested in Recuperaci6n econ6mica. The first set of cabinet
changes occurred in August. The appointment of Sergio 0. Jarpa to Interior and Modesto
Collados to Public Works held out the promise of policy modification for many groups,
including capitalists, medium and small businessmen, and opposition groups. With respect to
the interests of the pragmatic coalition, Jarpa strongly advocated an expansionary monetary
policy to spur economic reactivation. To achieve. that end, both Jarpa and the CPC fav_ored
the replacement of Finance Minister Caceres with someone closer to the CPC.

Jarpa also

wanted to broaden political liberalization in order to defuse a potential uprising. He quickly
began talks with Alianza Democratica in the hope of negotiating a political settlement
between the opposition and the military.
From the CPC's perspective, Modesto Collados' appointment to the Ministry of
Public Works was equally significant. As president of the Construction Chamber, he had
been responsible for that organization's contribution to Recuperaci6ri econ6mica. Thus, as a
condition for his accepting the post, he demanded and received a commitment for increased

22

Oue Pasa, no. 654, 20 October, 1983, and no. 655, October ~7, 1983.

16
spending in public works to help reactivate the economy. 23 .Lastly, even Economy Minister
Passicot-.:.a Chicago Boy sympathizer--declared that his ministry would take on a more active
role in the management of Chile's economy. 24
. Increased access to the policymaking process, another one of the pragmatic coalition's
long-standing demands, amplified the promise of economic policy .change. For example,
although Pinochet did not remove Finance Minister Caceres he agreed to more frequent
meetings with the CPC leadership. 25 Moreover, Caceres' incumbency in Finance was
uncertain, which raised the pragmatic coalition's hopes for change. Pinochet ordered a
11

shadow cabinet, 11 composed of men whose views were much closer to the CPC than

Caceres'--Luis Escobar and former Minister of Economy Manuel Martin--to accompany
Caceres to the United States on a debt renegotiation mission. 26 Escobar favored reflationary
policies, and Martin, as previously seen, was closely connected to the groups that drafted
Recuperaci6n econ6mica. It was commonly believed that one of them was. being groomed
for Caceres' position. Of course, business leaders also had easy access to Jarpa himself.
Moreover, in the middle of September 1983 the military government also agreed to establish
an Economic and Social Council, a CPC demand since the middle of July, 1983.27

·

23

Personal interview with Pablo Araya (Cchc), Ma,y 1989'.

24

Que Pasa, no. 655, October 27, 1983.

25

CPC, Minutes of Executive Committee meeting no. 591, September 5, 1983.

26

Hoy. no. 326, October 19, 1983.

27

Hoy. no. 313, July 20, 1983 and Que Pasa, no. 649, September 15, 1983.

17
Real concessions to· the pragmatic· neoliberal coalition gave credibility to the promise
of policy change. In September 1983; the CPC concentrated its lobbying efforts on the issue
of deficit spending. 28 It reiterateq. the demand, set forth in Recuperaci6n econ6mica, that ·
such outlays reach 4 % _of GDP. A month later Caceres complied. Deficit spending for 1984
would be around 5 % of GDP. 29 The CPC also praised Caceres for advances on another
'

sensitive policy issue, lower real interest rates.

30

Overall, they fell from/35 % in 1982 to

16% in 1983. In addition to these measures, the government quickly expanded housing and
public works programs, as expected given: Collados' appointment to the Ministry of Public
Works. 31 Lastly, the CPC had advocated cutting taxes for business as_ a means to stimulate
the economy since 1982. Finance Minister Caceres committed himself to such reform and
brought the business peak associations into the process of draftin~- a revised tax code. 32
Although the CPC softened its critique of government economic_ policy once the
authorities began to negotiate over economic policy change, it did not lift all pressure.
.

.

Essentially, the CPC stopped demanding the resignations of Finance Minister Caceres and

28
29

Hoy. no. 321, September 14, 1983.
Que Pasa, no. 655, October 27, 1983; and Hoy, no. 328, November~, 1983.

°CPC, minutes of Executive Commi~tee meeting no. 591, September 5, 1983.
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31

Que Pasa, no. 655 ;· October 27, 1983. Personal interviews with CPC: officials, ·
reinforced the conclusion that the government was progressively implementing the CPC' s
economic program.
32

Que Pasa, no. 649, September 15, 1983, reported that the Tax Reform bill was
virtually ready to clear the Legislative Commission in charge of economic affairs. Business
associations had ample access to the.policymaking process through the legislative
commissions. CNC, memorandum to Finance Minister Caceres, no. 265/83, Nov. 4, 1983.

18
Economy Minister Passicot. 33 But it continued to press for a purge of Chicago Boys who
held middle level positions in ministries and government agencies. It was generally fear¢
that they would try to impede reform implementation. 34 Furthermore, the CPC persistently
lobbied for economic policy changes outlined in Recuperaci6n econ6mica not yet addressed
'

'

by the government. 35 For example, the CPC pressed for a broader internal debt
}

renegotiation bill at lower than market interest rates (5 % over UF, an inflation adjusted
measure of v_alue). Moreover, business consistently used the document as its lobbying base
in meetings with government officials. Thus, if after September 1983 business seemed less
strident in the public presentation of its demands, its actual ·commitment and pursu_it of them
did not abate. And, as will .be seen, the military government continued to make concessions
on the basis of that document's recommendations in order to recapture a solid social base and
to defuse the political opposition to the regime.
For capitalists,
then, negotiation proved to be a fruitful alternative to confrontation,
.
.
.

especially under conditions in which Pinochet needed to build a stable base of support to
keep political liberalization within the narrow bounds· of the 1980 Constitution. Capitalists
renewed their unconditional support for the regime ortce the broadly inclusive pragmatic
coalition triumphed. Its elevation to dominant coalition status occurred wlien the military
government began to adopt its policy recommen9ations and piaced its representatives in key
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state ministries. Access to the economic poiicymaking process to the exclusion of all other
social groups cemented its dominant position.

The Social Pact Option: 1984
By October of 1983 AD had lost the edge in its efforts to promote-rapid and
substantial political liberalization. 36 Pinochet had broken off the "dialogue" with AD and
capitalists had returned to the fold. Thus, in- 1984,. after the failure of the "implicit" alliance
strategy, AD attempted to form an explicit social pact between capital and labor in order tQ

-

win capital over, or at least to keep it from opposing a transition. 37 The opposition hoped
that such a pact--Concerlacion Social--would allay the fears of capitalists over their fate in a
.,.

.

-

-,'1,";t<,

democratic regime. To this end, the PDC sponsored a series o_f workshopsjn late 1984. 38
Capitalists expressed a-concern over property rights and they wanted ironclad comniitments
against expropriation and competition by state enterprises. They also worried- about ch~ges
in the labor code that might strength~n: the labor movement. 39 Workers essentially wanted

36
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November 2, 1983.
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38

Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo, Concertacion social y democracia (Santiago: CED,
, 1985). ·
39
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empresarios-trabajadores,." Andres Feliu, "El punto de vista de 'los empresarios, II and .
_ commentary by Ricardo Claro.
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changes in the labor code t9 facilitate collective bargaining, better working conditions and
higher wages. 40
Chilean.capitalists, however, had a strong incentive to reject the concertaci6n project.
Throughout 1984, the pragmatic neoliberal coalition consolidated its dominance as evidenced
by a cumulative set of economic policy concessions. For example, an expansionary
economic· policy was clearly in place as measured by deficit spending, reduction in
unemployment, and lower interest rates. A more satisfactory debt rescheduJing scheme had
been introduced .. Moreover, the pragmatic coalition's access to, and participation in, the.
economic policy-making process had increased significantly.· The economic ministries ·as of .
April 1984 were head~ by "their" ministers (from Alessandri days), purges of Chicago boys
in administrative positions continued, they participated in ·the creation of the Plan Trierial,
and the Economic and Social Council had begun to function. These were ·significant gains
compared to the situation.up to mid-1983. 41 They gave the pragmatic coalition's leaders
sufficient strength and security to ·reject participation in a social pact with labor. 42
By 1985, capitalist~ had largely weathered the economic crisis, which was n_ow under
control, and had a more or less stable relationship with the military government. As a
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result, the- pragmatic neoliberal coalition began to maneuver to extract ecpnomic policy
concessions .from Alianza Democratica. In other words, the ·new dominant capitalist coalition·
sought to make the pragmatic neoliberal economic model an "untouchable" item in the future
regime.

THE TRIUMPH OF PRAGMATIC NEOLIBERALISM AND THE OPPOSITION'S ·
RESPONSE, 1986-88.
During this period the pragmatic coaliti.on sou~ht to consolidate its gaiqs. The
military government had largely adopted the economic model that it favored Md had given if
exclusive access· to the policymaki?g process. The creation of the Comisiones ,Nacfonales in
the Ministry of Economy in 1986 further enhanced tlie role of capitalists in economic ·
policymaking. Moreover, economic recovery and sustained growth solidified the terms of·
•

•

>

the bargain that held the pragmatic neoliberal coalition together. All capitalist and
landowning partners prospered.
As a result of these successes,. in· 1986 capitalists began a campaign to project the
pragmatic neoliberal model into the future. They' opposed not only socialism, but any
govemm~nt regulation or action that vitiated the current economic model. The SFF
\

spearheaded the public debate. Throughout 1986 it bluntly stated that the pragmatic
neoliberal model represented their, and of course, Chile's, best interesfs. Any alteration
could only lead to disaster.· The SFF demanded absolute_respect for private property.
Capitalists opposed renewed state participation in production, as well as joint ventures
between state and private entrepreneurs. In other words, they rejected AD's version of a
mixed economy and ardently supported privatization to reduce public sector competition.

22
Moreover,. Chile should maintain an open and free economy both internationally and
internally. This meant low across-the-board tariffs with high real exchange rates, protection
against unfair competition, and no controls on prices or forefgn exchange. Tax ~tructures and labor market arrangements should remain unaltered. 43
Between 1987 and October 1988,- the date of the plebiscite, the CPC,. the National
Landowners~ Society (SNA) and the National Merchants' Chamber (CNC) echoed the SFF's
'

pronouncements, _and declared their allegiance for Pinochet in th~ transition process. 44 With
the formation of S0""Called Civic Committees (Comites Civicos) in 1987 capitalists began to
campaign for the regime in the· coming plebiscite. The CPC publicly declared its support for ·
Pinochet in the beginning of 1988. 45
· . · In response to the unwavering position that capitalists took with ~espect to the
projection of their economic model, Alianza Democratica turned to ever more conservative
economic. policy pronouncements. The opposition also shifted its stance because the
eeonomic model was working and enjoying international prestige. AD hoped to assure·
-

.

capitalists and right-wing political parties that it did not represent: a threat to.established_
order, that it was a legitimate participant in what should be a negotiated transition to
democracy. Under Chilean circumstances that meant bargaining over the terms of the 1988
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plebiscite and various antidemocratic clauses of the 1980 Constitution. In short, AD
gambled that its moderate economic posture would induce a negotiated transition from
Pi.nochet's authoritarian regime to _a more democratic regime than that- contemplat~ by the
1980 Constitution. The opposition concentrated
on political democratization
rather. than.
'
economic change.
Althou~h AD had consistently.supported a ·mo_derate economic program, as l~te as September 1985 it still favored more state participation in production than that which
capitalists desired. 46 - But with the relative economi9 success of the· pragmatic economic ·
model,.· as well as the -solidification of the pragmatic capitalist coalition, AD softened its
-

-

position on state-enterprise. By.1988, the opposition continued to praise a mixed economy,
however, redefined as indt_1strial policy (targeting growth industries, supplying tax incentives
for investments, a11o~ating special credits, etc.). It no longer mentioned .state enterprise. 47

·

Thus, the opposition limited itself to a discussion of distributional issues within the limits of .
the neoliberal model. 48
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As a consequence of these further concessions on the part of the opposition, by early
1987 capitalists admitted that they no longer feared for their property rights. Instead~ they
recognized that probably not much would change regardless of who won the plebiscite.49
Their only real concern was that government intervention in markets might lead to economic
instability. 50 In fact, however, the CPC opposed even moderate economic reformism in the
interests of social justice. 51 Given their satisfaction with Pinochet's adoption of the
pragmatic rieoliberal model, and their inclusion in the policy-making process, capitalists
'

'

'

clung to Pinochet during the plebiscite because he shielded them from even the mildest ·
economic change.

PRAGMATIC .NEOLIBERALISM, CAPITALIST REGIME ALLEGIANCES AND
CHILE'S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY, 1983-91.

The rise of the pragmatic neoliberal coalition, its consolidation, and the relative
success of its economic model had several important consequences for Chile's political
transition. • First, the formation of the pragmatic neoliberaf coalition robbed the opposition
movement, led by AD, of

amajor capitalist and/or landowning ally, and it strengthened the

military government's core social base. This gave the regime the fortitude to resist
opposition demands for a more rapid transition to full political democracy. Pinochet and his
\
49
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supporters could bide their time and insist on a political transition with,in the_ ins.titutional
confines of the 1980 constitution: Plebiscite in 1989 with Pinochet virtually assured of his
. candid~wy, full elections in 1990 or 1997 depending on the outcome of the plebiscite,
-

-

electqtal laws designed without opposition participation (with all of the consequent
opportunity for gerrymandering) and full application of the pragmatic neoliberal economic
model in defiance of social equity. 52
The consolidation of the pragmatic neoliberal coalition and the successes of its
economic model between 1986 and 1988 had a '.second major effect. They induced the
opposition to further moderate it~ economic program. The Concertaci6n de Partidos por el
NO explicitly emphasized its acceptance of the pragmatic neoliberal economic model, and ..
that distributional issues would be addressed within its confines. The Concertaci6n further
demonstrated its commitment

to moderation by stressing .social and political reconciliation in.

a deeply divided and traumatized polity, rather than revenge for the abuses of 16 years of
arbitrary rule. 53
These concessions helped to assure a smooth political transition as stipulated by the
1980 Constitution.· Since the projection o~ pragmatic neoliberalism was no longer at issue,
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the opposition minimized the risk that the transition process might be reversed. 54 In 1988,
this allowed the opposition to press for a clean eJection, assure recognition for its victory,
and to set the stage for negotiated constitutional change with conservative political parties
after the plebiscite.
Events bore out the Concertacion's hopes. Although it had little impact on political
party, electoral districting, and Congressional representation rules (majoritarian_ vs.
proportional), it did establish the right to monitor counting procedures at voting booths. 55
Moreover, during th~ ballot count on the night" October 5, when many worried that Pinochet
might attempt to invalidate what appeared to be an opposition victory, conservativ~ poJitical
'

'

.~

party leaders from Renovacion Nacional--the largest conservative party--and Junta merpbers
Matthei and Stange conceded tha~ the Concertacion ·seemed to be winning. Thus, tney
undercut any intention Pinochet might have had to annul the plebiscite's:results:56 The No
campaign won by·a comfortable margin: 54.7% of the vote to 43% for the Si.57
, .ti ·-

' Presidential and congressional elections were scheduJed for December 14, 1989 and the
transfer of office was set for March 11, 1990.
These results set the stage for Chile's first presidential election since 1970. Christian
Democratic Party president Patricio Aylwin r~ for the Concertacion, former Pinochet
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,Minister of Finance Hernan Biichi for the conservatives @emocracia y Progreso), and .,
banker-businessman-populist Francisco Javier Errazuriz campaigned on an independent ticket.
Aylwin received 55.2% of the vote to Biichi's 29.4% and Errazuriz's 15.4%. Of the
Senate's 38 elected seats Concertaci6n parties won 22 and Democracia y Progreso got 16. 58 _
In the Chamber of Deputies _Aylwin's coalition garnered 69 .seats to the conservative
alliance's 48. The leftist Lista Partido Amplio de Izquierda Socialista (PAIS) obtained two
seats and independents received one. 59 The Concertaci6n essentially conducted the
'

.

presidential campaign on the same platform as the No crusade, 60 while Democ~acia y
Progreso emphasi~ed a neoliberal/libertarian platform. ~1
The Concertacion' s concessions to the pragmatic neoliberal coalition had a third
important corn~equence. It led to the forging of a democratic founding coalition in which
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conservatives held the upper hand. 62 In the 1980s,. the democratic opposition essentially
exchanged broad economic reform for political democratization. At the core of the pact
stood the fact· that reformist political parties--representing the midqle class and some· la~or.
sectors--explicitly committed themselves to pragmatic neoliberalism. In re:turri, businessmen,
landowners and cpnserva.tive political parties accepted limited political change.
Stretching the narrow limits of this constraining political bargain has proved· difficult
for reformists .. Two factors allow conservatives to dominate the founding coalition. First,
questions of .social equity are subordinate to the relatively unfettered play of market forces,
the emphasis is on social reform within the confines of the pragm~tic. neoliberal model. 63
Second, Chile's transition from authoritarianism took piace within the confines of the 1980
Constitution, a charter with numerous features designed to protect conservative interests from
reformists. Since it is still the law of the land, the structure of current political institutions
4

,

'

· are.not fully democratic, and they leave' reformist
Christian and social democrats at a
.
.

disadvantage. 64 To begin· with, the stmnchly conservative military has significant lut~nomy
from civilian control. As a result, civilian governments ·must continuously gauge the armed
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forces' reaction-to public policies. Moreover, the Senate is

a right-wing bastion with the

power to block or water down reformist laws. This is because the Senate has.nine appointed·
seats and the selection rules heavily favor conservatives. 65 · These institutional constraints
clearly"hampered Aylwin's attempt to pass legislation on tax and labor code reform--the
cornerstones of his mild social reform project.
With respect to labor, the administration favored a wage policy that tied raises to
productivity gains. 66 This, in theory, satisfied neoliberal demands for wage restraint t~
control inflation, and yet did not wholly abandon the,government's pledge to ad~ress long
postponed labor grievances. But achieving that goal required legislation to strengthen
unions, a key labor movement demand:
The government proposed a bill that reformed three key aspects of the labor old code.
First, the .administration'.s· proposals sought to make it more difficult and e~pensive to fire
workers. The old code allowed employers to let workers go without showing cause·and hire
replacements for strikers. Second, the Aylwin-bac~ed bill permitted unions to tiegcitiate ·
contracts by"economic sectm: rather than on a company by company basis. _Unions would
gain the right to negotiate health ·benefits and job security clauses. Third, the draft .
legislation _mandated that non-union employees would have to pay union fees if they

65 . The
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benefitted from union negotiated contracts. This stopped short of.the key Central Unica de
Trabajadores demand of mandatory union enrollment. 67
ChiJean capitalists, represented by the Confederaci6n de la Producci6n yComercio
(CPC) and conservative political parties such. as·Renovaci6n Nacional, consistently ·opposed
all of these measures. The appointed seats iff the Senate provided conservative forces with a
the
majority
in that chamber of the legislature, which forced the administration to negotiate
.
.
.

labor reform bill point by point with RN. 68 As a result, the legislation bogged down. 69
Reforms that addressed -the bare minimum of labor's agenda were gµtted, and with. them its
capacity to capture and retain wages on the basis of increased productivity.
The fate of tax· reform policy provides a second example of how the projection of
authoritarian political institutions into the new democratic period hampers attention to social .
. issues. In the interests of social equity, Aylwin's presidential campaign platform committed
his administration to the improvement of education and health services, the pro'7ision of loans .
and. technical assistance to start small businesses, the expansion of nutritional programs for
infants and pregnant women, and the introduction of consumption programs for the
indigent 70
Delivering on these promises required higher levels of government spending, which
was why the Aylwin government introduced legislation to.increase taxes on business.
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Althoug~ the tax_ reform bill passed, Renovaci6n Nacional managed keep the _tax increase
well within the bounds of what the CPC considered acceptable (from 10 % to 15 % of
earnings). Once again, the reason: for thi~ was the fact that conservatives dominated the
Senate. OJ) account 9f the appointed -seats. The CPC, however, was not able to block the
abolition of levies on estimated income for the agriculture, mining and transportation sectors
in favor of actual earnings. And the government gained additional revenue by raising the

.

.regressive value added tax from 16% to 18%, and managed.to transfer resources by cutting
the military's budget. 71
These partial and painstakingly negotiated advances in tax ,reform, however, are
vulnerable to an additional legacy of the authoritarian period--an autonomous Central Bank.
This institution reinforces the democratic founding coalition's commitment to pragmatic_
n~liberal economic policies: macro-economic stability over social amelioration. 72 The
bank's policies drain resources potentially earmarked for social programs because it allocates
a share of tax reform revenue to maintain -a balanced budget and to fight inflation. 73
Ironically, while the administration uses tight monetary policy to demonstrate its commitment
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to the pragmatic neoliberal model, ~apitalists seem to think that even meager increases in
social spending by the government are detrimental to the private sector. 74
The evidence of the first years- of Ayiwin's government confirms the expectation that
the Concertacion's tacit alliance with the-pragmatic neoliberal ·coalition strongly diminished
the possibilities for even mild economic reforms. The pragmatic neoliberal development
model is based· on a highly unequal. distribution of wealth.

A commit~ent to that economic

· model largely locks centrist political parties and moderate socialists into retaining skewed
distributional patterns,. albeit against their best il\tentions. Chile's current political
institutions reinforce that tendency. Very mild adjustments and symbolic gestures~, h<>wever? ·
are still possible.
The founding democratic alliance, then, not only includes businessmen and
landowners in the policy coalition, but gives them strong institutional means with which .to
defend their interests: a broad definition of property rights and profits. Under these·
circumstances, ceterisparibus, they should continue to support democr~tic rule.

So f¥; they

hav~ demonstrated their general satisfaction by occasionally defending the Aylwin
government when political forces impatient for economic and social reform attack it. 75 In
. other words, the emphasis

on: moderc;1tion and negotiation seems to augur well for political

stability. However, whether that translates into more democratization remc;lins to be seen.
Deepening political democracy in Chile requires reducing military prerogatives, which the
,-
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armed _forces resist, and removing the 1980 constitution's authoritarian features, which may
· also prove difficult. 76
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